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Influenza may rapidly disseminate within populations
living in confined settings, causing considerable morbidity
and disrupting daily activities. We describe an influenza A
outbreak on a military base where 3,000 young adults,
most of whom were unvaccinated, lived in close daily con-
tact. Visits to the base clinic by 48 persons with acute res-
piratory illness within 2 days allowed early identification of
this outbreak and prompted immediate epidemiologic
investigation. Overall, 85 personnel (2.83% of base popu-
lation) met the case definition for influenzalike illness. On-
site laboratory confirmation with field detection kits, rapid
implementation of respiratory illness control protocols, and
a mass vaccination campaign were applied to limit disease
dissemination. The outbreak was halted 14 days after the
mass vaccination campaign was completed. We review the
control measures available for controlling influenza out-
breaks in confined settings and discuss the role of rapid
mass vaccination within this context.
I
nfluenza causes substantial illness and loss of work days
among young adults, and outbreaks can affect the pre-
paredness of military units (1). The generally recommend-
ed measures for controlling influenza outbreaks (e.g.,
isolation, quarantine, hygiene enhancement) (2) may not
be sufficient to contain an outbreak in such confined set-
tings, when attack rate may be as high as 45% (3). We
describe an influenza outbreak in which rapid identifica-
tion of the causative agent permitted mass vaccination to
be used as a control measure, examine the effects of this
intervention on disease dissemination, and discuss the
potential role of this control measure in containing influen-
za epidemics.
Methods
Over a 2-day period during January 2002, 48 patients
sought treatment at the clinic of a large military base in
central Israel; their symptoms included fever, cough, and
sore throat. This unusually high patient load prompted the
clinic commander to notify headquarters, and a team from
the Epidemiology Section of the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) Medical Corps arrived at the scene by the next
morning (outbreak day 3) and initiated an epidemiologic
investigation. The investigation team retrieved all patient
visit records for the preceding 2 weeks from the clinic’s
computerized patient files and continued daily follow-up
for 4 additional weeks. The case definitions defined acute
respiratory illness (ARI) as cough, sore throat, or coryza.
Influenzalike illness (ILI), a subset of ARI, was defined as
ARI with temperature >37.8°C (>100.0°F). Cases were
classified according to these case definitions, and epidem-
ic curves were constructed. Demographic information,
including sex, rank, unit, and influenza vaccination status,
were retrieved from personnel records. Active surveillance
for ARI was initiated among all post personnel. 
Oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal specimens were
tested in the field by using rapid influenza tests (Influenza
A/B Rapid Test, Roche Diagnostics, Basel, Switzerland),
and these results were verified with immunofluorescence
staining and viral culture. The IDF health corps at that time
had >2,000 available doses of influenza vaccine. This vac-
cine was a subunit influenza preparation, containing
influenza A and B strains equivalent to A/New
Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1)-like, A/Moscow/10/99 (H3N2)-
like, and B/Sichuan/379/99-like strains, in accordance
with World Health Organizations recommendations for the
Northern Hemisphere 2001–2002 winter season (4).
Active surveillance was continued for 24 days to assess the
effect of the employed control measures on the dissemina-
tion pattern of the outbreak.
Results
The base housed ≈3,000 men and women, of whom 136
(4.5%) had been vaccinated against influenza during the
preceding 3 months as part of routine, seasonal preventive
health measures. These 136 vaccinees made up 87.7% of
the vaccine-eligible personnel in this base; 19 other per-
sonnel refused to receive the vaccine that winter. Initial
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2-day period January 13–14, 2002 (outbreak days 1 and 2),
were indeed significantly higher than the preceding daily
average rates (24 vs. 4.1 patient visits/24 h, p < 0.001).
During these 2 days, ILI was responsible for a significant-
ly higher proportion of all clinic visits, compared with vis-
its during the preceding 2 weeks (21% vs. 4.3%, p <
0.001). 
The epidemic curves of ARI and ILI are shown in the
Figure. During outbreak days 1 and 2, a total of 48 cases
of ARI were recorded; 34 met the criteria for ILI. None of
the patients had been vaccinated against influenza in the
preceding 12 months. Cases were evenly distributed across
all areas of the base and among all ranks, with no specific
unit on post showing an exceptionally high attack rate. On
weekends the base clinic treated emergency cases only,
which explains the artifactual cyclic lacunae visible on the
curve. 
Ten oropharyngeal and nasopharyngeal specimens
were tested on outbreak day 3 by using a rapid influenza
kit; 1 was positive. Seven of these specimens were later
found to be positive for influenza A virus by immunofluo-
rescence staining and culture. This information was only
available after the decision to undertake a mass vaccina-
tion campaign had been made and the campaign had been
carried out. Typing the virus from culture showed that 6 of
the 7 influenza-positive cultures were A/Moscow/10/99
(H3N2)-like, a strain included in the 2001–2002 vaccine
composition. Specific typing of the seventh culture was
unavailable.
Control measures immediately employed from out-
break day 3 and afterward included active case finding,
strict isolation, and placing patients on sick leave, and
infirmary records confirm that 82.4% of patients with
physician-confirmed ILI were indeed sent for sick leave
off post. Despite the introduction of the above measures,
new ILI patients continued to appear, as shown in the
Figure. Because of the potential for further dissemination
of the disease among unvaccinated personnel and the oper-
ational implications of such disease spread on troop pre-
paredness, additional steps directed towards active
intervention were initiated. As sufficient quantities of
antiviral drugs were not readily available at that time,
>2,200 doses of influenza vaccine were rapidly transport-
ed on outbreak day 4 to the base for use in an immediate
mass vaccination campaign. Within 2 days (outbreak days
4–5), 2,118 soldiers (>70% of the base population) were
vaccinated.
The outbreak had a substantial impact on military activ-
ities. Key commanders and personnel were incapacitated
by their illness for several days, thus disrupting the opera-
tional routine. Entry to and exit from the base were denied,
except to those with documents showing they had been
vaccinated, and training operations were suspended during
the outbreak in an attempt to avoid noncrucial congrega-
tion and limit disease dissemination. 
Over the next 2 weeks (outbreak days 4–17), patient
visits to the clinic due to ARI and ILI remained high,
despite the intervention measures taken; a mean daily rate
of 3 cases of ILI was maintained. As shown in the Figure,
illness remained high for 17 days, after which time illness
rates returned to preepidemic levels. We defined outbreak
termination as the day from which the daily onset of new
ILI cases was <4 (the highest single daily ILI incidence
observed during the preoutbreak period). Although the out-
break initially appeared to have ended on outbreak day 12,
the 5 ILI patients seen in the cluster on outbreak day 17
exceeded this cutoff value so that the day of termination
was set at outbreak day 18. After day 18, incidence
declined to a mean daily rate of 1.9 cases for ARI and 0.4
for ILI. These rates were maintained for an additional 10
days, at which time active surveillance was stopped.
Overall, 140 ARI cases were recorded within 17 days, 85
of which (60.7%) met the case definition for ILI. The ARI
attack rate during this outbreak was 46.7/1,000, and the ILI
attack rate was 28.3/1,000. None of the patients required
hospitalization. 
Discussion
An outbreak of influenza in a military base with a large-
ly unvaccinated population was rapidly identified and was
subsequently halted 14 days after a rapid mass vaccination
program. Disease dissemination during influenza outbreaks
in military bases can have reach attack rates as high as
37%–45% (3,5), and similar rates were noted during out-
breaks on naval ships (6). With no control group in this
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Figure. Daily incidence of acute respiratory illness (ARI) cases at
base infirmary, by case definition. Shaded segment of bar indi-
cates ARI cases that met the definition of influenzalike illness (ILI)
(temperature  >37.8°C). Nonshaded segment indicates ARI cases
that did not meet the ILI criterion (non-ILI). Arrows: A) vaccination
campaign initiation, B) vaccination campaign termination, C) day
14 after campaign initiation.case, we cannot predict the exact attack rate that would
have been reached, had this unusual intervention not been
applied. However, several factors in the setting of this out-
break lead us to believe the expected attack rate would have
been much higher than 2.83%. These factors include the
initial high incidence rate; the even distribution of cases
across all areas of the base and among all ranks; the large
substrate for disease dissemination in a base of ≈3,000
young men, mostly unvaccinated, living in confined set-
tings and in close everyday contact; and the continuous
incidence of new cases, despite conservative measures
employed, an incidence that had not completely subsided
until 14 days after the mass vaccination campaign. Such a
low attack rate probably cannot be attributed solely to the
natural course of the outbreak and seems to indicate that
control measures had a substantial beneficial effect.
Although this group of healthy, working adults is not at
increased risk for serious complications, influenza is not a
trivial illness in this group. Prominent manifestations
include increased work absenteeism, impaired work pro-
ductivity when ill, and a low yet clinically important inci-
dence of serious complications (7,8). In the military, work
absenteeism may hinder units’ preparedness. In the case
presented, the outbreak was contained in time to prevent
the base strategic abilities from being compromised.
Seasonal vaccination of young adults, mainly in crowd-
ed settings, is both highly successful and cost-effective
(9,10). Routine vaccination of similar population groups,
including students and other persons in institutional set-
tings, is currently encouraged by the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations for
prevention and control of influenza (2). IDF conducts an
annual influenza vaccination campaign, directed at crucial
fighting-unit personnel and personnel with chronic respira-
tory and cardiac disease. Most of the personnel of the base
in question (>95%) did not fall under any of these cate-
gories and were not vaccinated for influenza. Influenza
vaccination is not forced during the IDF annual vaccina-
tion campaigns, and each year a variable proportion of
vaccine-eligible troops refuse to be vaccinated. On this
base, 136 personnel, 87.7% of the base target population,
were vaccinated during that year’s vaccination campaign.
Nineteen vaccine-eligible subjects (12.3%) refused to
receive the vaccine that winter. This refusal rate is well
within the expected range, according to previous years’
experience (unpub. data).
The outbreak emphasizes the crucial role of continuous
surveillance for respiratory disease in the military, as rapid
detection is a major factor of successful intervention. The
explosive pattern of this outbreak, as demonstrated by the
sudden illness rate increase in the first 2 days of the out-
break, enabled rapid detection and initiation of prompt
investigation. Illness caused by influenza virus is difficult
to distinguish clinically from that of other respiratory
pathogens on the basis of symptoms alone. Reported sen-
sitivity of clinical definitions for ILI (defined as fever and
cough) has ranged from 63% to 78%; reported specificity
has ranged from 55% to 71%, respectively, when com-
pared to diagnosis by viral culture (11,12). In this case,
decisions concerning which control measures to imple-
ment, including mass vaccination, were made on outbreak
day 3. The mass vaccination campaign was carried out dur-
ing outbreak days 4 and 5, several days before culture-
based influenza diagnosis was available. The diagnosis
was therefore based on the combination of clinical signs,
epidemiologic characteristics, and results of a rapid
influenza identification kit. The kit is designed to detect
both influenza A and B viruses (but not to distinguish
between them), with a reported sensitivity of 77.4% and
specificity as high as 93% (13). These characteristics ren-
der the kit inappropriate for the diagnosis of influenza in
individual patients, but the kit remains a useful tool for
implicating influenza as the causative agent in large out-
breaks, even if only a few patients test positive (14). 
Confirmation of influenza A with immunofluorescence
staining and viral culture requires at least several days, a
timeframe in which an influenza outbreak may grow out of
control. Decision-making regarding control measures
should not necessarily be delayed until such confirmation
is achieved. In this case, decisions on intervention meas-
ures were made several days before culture results became
available, and the diagnosis was based on clinical and epi-
demiologic characteristics and the results of the rapid
influenza detection kit. Guidelines for outbreak control in
young adults within confined settings (i.e., military bases,
correctional facilities, or college dormitories) are scarce
are probably similar to guidelines used for quelling nurs-
ing home outbreaks. In the latter case, recommended
measures include active identification of patients with con-
firmed or suspected influenza, restriction of staff move-
ment between wards or buildings, restriction of contact
between ill staff or visitors and patients, influenza vaccina-
tion for staff and patients, and use of antiviral drugs (2).
Some of these recommendations may not be applicable in
an active military unit, most notably isolation and wide-
spread restriction of movement. Antiviral agents in suffi-
cient quantities may not always be available, as in our
case, but when they are available, they may play an impor-
tant role in stopping such outbreaks. 
Mass vaccination as a means of controlling outbreaks
has several limitations. The vaccine may reach its full
potential effectiveness (70%–90% reduction in influenza
illness) only when the vaccine and circulating viruses are
antigenically similar (2). The incubation period of the
influenza virus is 1–3 days, whereas the development of
antibodies in adults after vaccination can take up to 2
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In this time, the virus can complete several infection
cycles, therefore rendering mass vaccination inappropriate
as a sole measure of intervention and only appropriate
when the susceptible population size is large enough that
the outbreak can be expected not to subside within 2
weeks. In instances when an influenza outbreak is not con-
tained by using routine protocol and a large portion of the
population is unvaccinated and remains at risk, mass vac-
cination can ensure the termination of the outbreak within
≈2 weeks. When available, prophylaxis with antiviral
drugs must be considered an adjunct to other control meas-
ures such as isolation of patients, hygiene enhancement
campaigns, and reduction of crowding to a necessary min-
imum in limiting disease dissemination to a minimum dur-
ing this time frame. These control measures may confer
important information for unit commanders, since the 2-
week period provides a point of reference for projecting
troop readiness. When the population at risk carries crucial
deployment responsibilities, as was the case in our out-
break, mass vaccination may be imperative. 
Following this outbreak, efforts have been directed at
increasing the acceptance of seasonal influenza vaccina-
tion in the specific populations within the IDF. Brochures
and lectures were used to deliver evidence-based informa-
tion about the benefits of influenza vaccination to both the
troops and the base physicians. Assessment of the effect of
these measures on compliance with influenza vaccination
is now underway.
When feasible and affordable, preventive seasonal
influenza vaccination is preferable to rapid vaccination
during an outbreak because of the above-described caveats
of the latter strategy. For the time being, however, the IDF
will continue to focus its annual influenza vaccination
campaigns on specific groups, mainly because of the high
costs associated with universal coverage. Under these cir-
cumstances, influenza outbreaks such as the one presented
here can be expected to recur, and adequate quantities of
antiviral agents and vaccines must be made readily avail-
able to control future outbreaks. Active surveillance for
ILI, including continuous laboratory sampling, is now
under way in specific field units within the IDF in an
attempt to uncover the viral pathogens that account for ILI
and estimate the true incidence of influenza in unvaccinat-
ed subpopulations. Since recent outbreaks of highly patho-
genic avian influenza in East Asia may herald the next
influenza pandemic, heed must be taken now to implement
and evaluate an array of outbreak control measures during
the interpandemic period.
Conclusions
Early reporting of a potential influenza outbreak among
soldiers, on-site laboratory confirmation with field detec-
tion kits, and rapid implementation of mass vaccination
combined with a respiratory illness control protocol likely
limited the magnitude of this outbreak. In confined set-
tings, when the threat of an acceleration of the outbreak is
substantial, antiviral drugs are not available in abundant
amounts, and sufficient vaccine doses are available, mass
vaccination of the population at risk should be considered
because it should ensure the termination of the outbreak
within 10–14 days. Conservative control measures must
serve as adjuncts to limit disease dissemination during this
period until the vaccine takes effect.
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